Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort by Sperino, Sandra F.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 65 
Issue 2 Winter 2016 Twenty-First Annual 
Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social 
Policy 
Article 16 
Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort 
Sandra F. Sperino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, 65 DePaul L. Rev. (2016) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol65/iss2/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL210.txt unknown Seq: 1  2-AUG-16 10:00
DISCRIMINATION LAW: THE NEW FRANKEN-TORT
Sandra F. Sperino*
INTRODUCTION
In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court imported tort law into
federal discrimination law.1  The Court used the language of tort law,
relying on concepts like intent, but-for cause, and proximate cause.
The Court did not claim to alter these concepts to accommodate the
discrimination statutes’ texts, purposes, or histories.  Rather, the cases
purport to apply common law concepts in their traditional forms as
described in cases, treatises, and the Restatement of Torts.
This pure common law narrative is flawed in two respects.  First, the
U.S. Supreme Court often purported to rely on traditional tort law but
defined tort concepts in ways that were different from how they are
traditionally understood.  For example, the Court imported the con-
cept of factual cause into discrimination law.  It defined factual cause
as requiring the plaintiff to establish but-for cause in age discrimina-
tion and in retaliation cases.2  The Court ignored that tort law allows a
plaintiff to establish factual cause through a substantial factor stan-
dard and that tort law sometimes allows causation burdens to shift to
the defendant.3
* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
I would like to thank Richard Epstein and my copanelists, Thomas Colby, Mark Geistfeld, John
Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, for their insightful comments and questions about this Arti-
cle.  Special thanks to Stephan Landsman for organizing such a rich and thought-provoking
symposium.
1. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,
562 U.S. 411 (2011); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
2. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533 (requiring a Title VII retaliation claim to conform to the but-
for causation standard); Gross, 557 U.S. at 177–78 (requiring but-for cause in Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) disparate treatment cases).
3. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980) (discussing ways that plaintiffs
could recover despite being unable to establish which defendant caused the harm); Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3–5 (Cal. 1948) (“If defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each
liable for damages caused by him alone, but matter of apportionment is incapable of proof,
innocent wronged party should not be deprived of redress.  The wrongdoers should be left to
work out between themselves any apportionment.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABIL-
ITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (noting that a different
factual cause standard exists when multiple sufficient causes exist); id. § 27 cmt. a (stating that
there is nearly universal recognition that the but-for standard is inappropriate when multiple
sufficient causes exist); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
721
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court ignored the ways
in which the unique characteristics of the employment discrimination
statutes necessarily change the underlying tort concepts.  For example,
the federal discrimination statutes hold the employer, not individuals,
liable for statutory violations.  Traditional definitions of tort concepts,
such as intent, largely conceptualize wrongful acts perpetrated by one
actor who is a person.  Importing tort concepts into a statute that pro-
vides entity liability changes these concepts in important ways.
This tortification project has transformed federal discrimination law
into a new “Franken-tort.”4  This new Franken-tort has component
pieces that only vaguely resemble the component pieces from which it
was drawn.  The U.S. Supreme Court created this new Franken-tort
through a series of cases, each of which focuses on one or two distinct
tort concepts.5  This Article is the first to piece together these dispa-
rate cases to unveil the new tort the Court has created.  When consid-
ered together, this new tort only vaguely resembles any tort imagined
to date.
When courts radically change an existing cause of action or create a
new one, they often disguise the changes by relying on the language
and structure of traditional common law doctrines;6 thus, courts can
claim to reason from prior principles and an existing body of law.  Al-
though this move is not new, the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of tort law
in the discrimination context raises three important problems.  First,
the Court imported tort doctrine in a piecemeal fashion, focusing on
small questions like factual cause.  The Court has never explained how
the pieces fit back together.  Second, the Court has failed to connect
the new tort regime with either the text of the discrimination statutes
or the decades of case law that preceded tortification.  Finally, once
the individual pieces are put together, it is unclear whether the emerg-
ing structure actually determines whether an employer treated an em-
ployee differently because of a protected trait.  The move to tort law
(noting that there can be more than one source of harm); id. § 432 (noting that plaintiffs can still
establish factual cause when more than one actor causes harm); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 9 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (defining a legal cause as one that is a “substantial factor
in bringing about the harm”).
4. Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein recounts how Victor Frankenstein created a living mon-
ster.  In his attempt to create life, Victor pieced together individual body parts from multiple
corpses and re-animated them.  The resulting monster was grotesque and unlike the form Dr.
Frankenstein intended.  1 MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSETIN; OR THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS (1823).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the tortification of employment discrimination).
6. See Anita Bernstein, How To Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539,
1545 (1997) (discussing how new torts often emerge by pretending to mirror traditional doctrines
but then modifying that doctrine over time).
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will inevitably create more confusion in an already complicated dis-
crimination jurisprudence.
This tortification of discrimination law also poses many questions
for tort law, especially the Restatement of Torts.  The Restatement is no
longer just a restatement of torts; it is now also going to be called on
as a “Restatement of Torts and Federal Employment Discrimination.”
One goal of this Article is to alert torts scholars, judges, and practi-
tioners about the Restatement’s new role in discrimination jurispru-
dence.  In many ways, the U.S. Supreme Court has turned the
Restatement of Torts into the Restatement of Torts and Civil Rights.
But, this move is not unidirectional.  As the Court is using tort law to
redefine discrimination law, it is also changing and restructuring the
underlying tort law.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II briefly outlines the U.S.
Supreme Court’s move to tortify discrimination law.7 Parts III, IV,
and V discuss the ways the Court is modifying and restructuring tort
concepts.8  Part VI discusses the new tort and discrimination elements
as well as the challenges they raise.9
II. THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Since the late 1980s, courts and legal scholars have labeled federal
employment discrimination statutes as torts, and courts have increas-
ingly applied tort concepts to these statutes.10  Over the past decade,
this tortification of employment discrimination law has picked up
speed.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked tort law to
interpret two of the cornerstone federal employment discrimination
statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)11 and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).12
7. See infra notes 10–55 and accompanying text. R
8. See infra notes 56–115 and accompanying text. R
9. See infra notes 116–36 and accompanying text. R
10. See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 70–80 (1990) (discussing deci-
sions from the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court term that applied common law concepts to employment
law); see, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418–19 (2011); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557
U.S. 167, 176 (2009);  Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990); 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS  237 n.2 (2001); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperat-
ing: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 66, 72 n.33 (1995). But see Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrim-
ination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1275–80 (1988) (arguing that common law causation prin-
ciples should not be robustly applied to discrimination law).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
12. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)).  The arguments made in this Article are applicable
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In the late 1980s, the Court noted that “common-law principles may
not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.”13  By 2011, the
Court declared: we start from the premise that when Congress creates
a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law.”14  The
U.S. Supreme Court now picks words out of discrimination statutes,
declares those words to derive from tort law, and then looks up the
words’ meanings in the Restatement of Torts or other sources.15  In
many instances, the Restatement of Torts is becoming the default dic-
tionary for certain terms in the discrimination statutes.
In prior work, I explained in detail how the courts infused tort law
into federal discrimination law.16  The following is an abbreviated his-
tory, drawing from that prior work.  This history can be broken down
into three periods: (1) an early period with relatively little use of tort
law; (2) a middle period with an increasing but still rare use of tort
law; and (3) the present period with a more automatic and robust use
of tort law.
In the early period from 1964 until 1988, the courts rarely invoked
tort law in the discrimination law context.  During this era, courts per-
formed important interpretive work that defined the contours of pat-
tern or practice claims, individual disparate treatment claims,
disparate impact claims, and harassment claims.  Even though these
early cases dealt with concepts such as causation, intent, or harm, they
did not invoke tort concepts.17  These early cases structured the initial
contours of discrimination law and began to define and clarify key
concepts, such as causation, intent, or harm.  Until 1989, the U.S. Su-
preme Court did not heavily rely on tort analysis or the common law
in discrimination cases brought under Title VII or the ADEA.18
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) context as well. See generally Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-36, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of  42 U.S.C.).  The ADA is not a primary focus of this discussion because the U.S.
Supreme Court cases center on Title VII and the ADEA.  I will not make arguments about cases
brought pursuant to § 1981.
13. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), quoted in Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–92 (1998).
14. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
15. See, e.g., Univ. of Sw. Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013).
16. See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law and Proximate Cause,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
17. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).  The Court also suggested that it would be appropriate
to apply common law principles of agency to sexual harassment claims but declined to defini-
tively rule on this issue. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.  The Court noted that “such common-law princi-
ples may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Id.
18. The minimal role played by tort law during this period is even more remarkable given that
the U.S. Supreme Court had conceptualized other civil rights statutes as torts during this period.
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The second era in the history of tortification occurred from 1989
until 2008.  This era began with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.19  After Price Waterhouse, the Court be-
gan to use tort law more often in discrimination cases.  However, dur-
ing this time, the use of tort law was less automatic and less robust
than it became in the period from 2009 until the present.
In Price Waterhouse, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a
plaintiff could prevail on a Title VII claim if she could show that both
legitimate and discriminatory reasons played a role in the employer’s
refusal to promote her.20  In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor
proclaimed that Title VII is a “statutory employment tort.”21
Despite Justice O’Connor’s labeling of Title VII as a tort, the Price
Waterhouse plurality opinion ultimately rejected tort principles.  A
plurality of four justices described the statutory problem before it not
through the lens of tort law but, rather, as a broader question about
the nature of causation.22  The issue was not what tort law required
but, instead, what kind of conduct violated Title VII.  The plurality
recognized that this question required the Court to consider how Title
VII balanced the interests of employees and employers.23  It rejected
the idea that causation meant that the plaintiff is required to establish
but-for cause.24  The plurality reasoned that “[t]o construe the words
‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation’ . . . is to
misunderstand them.”25  The plurality held that to prevail on a dis-
For example, in 1974, the Court characterized the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil
Rights Act as “sound[ing] basically in tort.”  Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974).  The
Court was not able to decide what the closest tort analog should be. See id. at 195, 195 n.10
(arguing that housing discrimination could be like common law innkeeper duties, defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or a dignitary tort).
19. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166,
§ 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888–91
(2014).
20. Id. at 232.
21. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  At the same time, her concurrence did not reflect
the rigid formality that would occur in later cases.  Although Justice O’Connor believed that
causation meant but-for cause, she disaggregated this question from the question of which party
was responsible for proving causation. Id. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice
O’Connor viewed the case as requiring the Court to determine “what allocation of the burden of
persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the intent of Congress and the purposes
behind Title VII.” Id. at 263 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Court also recognized that given
the specific ways employment decisions are made, requiring a plaintiff to prove that a protected
trait was a definitive reason for an employment outcome was “tantamount to declaring Title VII
inapplicable to such decisions.” Id. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 237–38 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 239.
24. Id. at 240.
25. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
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crimination claim, the plaintiff must establish that a protected trait is a
motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.26
In 1991, Congress responded to Price Waterhouse and other deci-
sions by amending Title VII.27  Importantly, the amendments do not
mimic tort common law or invoke it.28 Price Waterhouse foreshad-
owed the importance of tort law in the employment discrimination
context, but the immediate period after Price Waterhouse did not wit-
ness the extensive use of tort principles.  During this period, in the few
cases when the Court discussed tort law in the context of discrimina-
tion, the Court often rejected portions of tort analysis and argued that
“common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particu-
lars to Title VII.”29
Nonetheless, the move to tort law gained momentum in the period
from 2009 to the present.  Three cases during this time period showed
a change in the way that tort law is invoked in discrimination cases:
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,30 Staub v. Proctor Hospital,31
and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.32  In
these three cases, the use of tort law commands a majority of the
Court.  The use of tort law is also tied to textual claims in which cer-
tain words or concepts in discrimination law are directly interpreted
through the lens of tort law.
26. Id. at 244–45.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
28. Under the amendments, a plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim if she
establishes a protected trait was a motivating factor for a decision, and the employer may estab-
lish a limited defense to damages only if it shows it would have made the same decision absent a
protected trait. Id. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  Congress also amended Title VII’s dispa-
rate impact provisions, and these amendments do not mimic tort law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A).  Although Congress did add additional tort-like remedies to Title VII, there is little
indication that these remedies were designed to transform Title VII into a tort.  When Congress
defined compensatory damages under Title VII, it provided a more narrow definition of these
damages than the one imposed under common law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2).  The damages
provision for the ADEA, which is modeled after the Fair Labor Standards Act, provides only
limited remedies and not the full panoply of damages that would be available at common law.
29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (2012).
29. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–45 (1999) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)) (discussing tort law with respect to punitive dam-
ages).  In some cases, references to tort sources are not used to imbue the statute with tort law.
See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (quoting a torts treatise for the idea that
medical professionals can deviate from a consensus view).  The U.S. Supreme Court has also
applied tort reasoning to other federal employment statutes. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994).
30. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
31. 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
32. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
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In each case, the Court purports to simply import common law doc-
trines into the statutory regime.  There is almost no discussion sug-
gesting that the Court modified the concepts in any way to specifically
fit the employment discrimination context or to mold these concepts
given the specific histories or purposes of the employment discrimina-
tion statutes.
Importantly, each case deals with only one or two specific tort ele-
ments.  None of the cases pull together the individual elements to de-
scribe how these new tort-like understandings work together with
other tort-like principles or with the rest of the statutory regime,
which does not have a language or a structure that mimics traditional
torts.
In Gross, the Court focused on factual cause.33  The Court held that
the ADEA required a showing of but-for cause.34  In so holding, the
Court appeared to rely on a simple textual analysis.  The majority iso-
lated the “because of” language in the ADEA and found sources to
support the idea that “because of” means but-for cause.35  In support
of this proposition, Justice Thomas cited two cases outside the em-
ployment discrimination context as well as a torts treatise.36  The
Court rejected the idea that the ADEA should use the same causal
standard as Title VII and largely disregarded its earlier holding in
Price Waterhouse.
The Gross opinion purported to apply tort causation principles, but
the Court changed tort law in two important ways.  The majority in-
sisted that causation only referred to but-for cause, while tort law does
not always require proof of but-for cause.37  The Court did not con-
sider whether discrimination cases are like cases in which the common
law would refuse to apply but-for cause.
The Court also placed the burden of proving causation entirely on
the plaintiff.38  The Court did not discuss how tort law allows for cau-
sation burdens to be allocated differently in some scenarios.  The
opinion did not grapple with whether the but-for standard furthers the
33. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
34. Id. at 177.
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id. (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2008) and Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64, 64 n.14 (2007)).
37. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If two
forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s negligence, the other not because of any
misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s
negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”).
38. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77.
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goals of the ADEA and did not explain how the but-for cause element
related to any other required element for proving discrimination.39
The U.S. Supreme Court also invoked common law tort principles
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital,40 in which the Court interpreted the Uni-
formed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(USERRA).  The Court’s short analysis began with the statement:
“we start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it
adopts the background of general tort law.”41  Lower courts have ap-
plied, and are likely to keep applying, this reasoning in the Title VII
context because in the Staub decision, the U.S. Supreme Court em-
phasized the similarities between USERRA and Title VII.42
Staub used two common law ideas: intent and proximate cause.  The
Court noted that intent requires a person to intend the consequences
of her actions or believe that consequences are substantially certain to
occur.43  The Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ (Restate-
ment (Second)) definition of intent and also cited a case that refers to
the Restatement (Second).44  Strangely, the Court also introduced a
proximate cause element into its discussion even though the statute
does not use the term “proximate cause.”45
In Staub, more than in any other tort-based discrimination case, the
Court struggled with how to put all of the elements of the discrimina-
tion claim together.  The Court recognized the claim as an intent-
based claim, but it also recognized that the employer is the entity lia-
ble for the harm caused.46  The Court considered agency principles as
a possible way to solve the intent issue but found the available law
indeterminate.47
39. Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that but-for cause is problematic in cases involving motives
as opposed to physical forces. Id. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  He also recognized that the
defendant is in the better position to understand why an employment decision was made. Id. at
191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40. 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
41. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011).
42. See id. at 417; Jajeh v. Cty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012); Davis v. Omni-Care,
Inc., 482 F. A’ppx 102, 109 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012).
43. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417, 419 n.2.
44. Id. at 417 (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998) and 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)); see also id. at 422 n.3 (citing 2 RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (“Intent,” as it is used throughout the Restatement of
Torts, has reference to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself . . . .  Intent is limited,
wherever it is used, to the consequences of the act.”)).
45. Id. at 419–20 (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010), Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004), and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830,
837 (1996)).
46. Id. at 417–18.
47. Id. at 418–20.
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Without a very thorough or convincing discussion, it appears the
Court gave up piecing together a carefully constructed tort-based
analysis.  Instead, it used tort words like “intent” and “proximate
cause” and threw them together in a one sentence holding with almost
no discussion of how the pieces fit together.  The Court held: “We
therefore hold that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by an-
timilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action, then the employer is liable. . . .”48
As discussed throughout this Article, the Court’s difficulty is under-
standable.  It is using tort words and partial tort meanings to describe
discrimination concepts without realizing the many ways that tradi-
tional tort frameworks are unsuitable to the task.  It also combines
intentional tort language with proximate cause, even though the latter
concept has its primary use in negligence claims.
Nassar continued the recent trend of using tort concepts in discrimi-
nation cases.  In that case, the Court answered the question of
whether a plaintiff proceeding on a Title VII retaliation claim is re-
quired to establish but-for cause.49  As with Gross, the opinion par-
tially relied on the complex relationship between past U.S. Supreme
Court precedent and the 1991 amendments to Title VII.50  However,
this does not detract from the importance of torts in this case.  Once
the Court decided not to follow Price Waterhouse and the 1991
amendments to Title VII, it must make a choice regarding what the
causation standard should be.  The choice the Court makes—but-for
cause—is largely driven by the majority opinion’s narrow view of tort
law and by Gross, which also relied on tort law.51
Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of the opinion, defining
the case as one involving causation and then noting that causation in-
quiries most commonly arise in tort cases.52  The majority engaged in
a lengthy discussion of causation’s role in tort law with numerous cita-
tions to the Restatement and a torts treatise.53  The Court indicated
that “textbook tort law” requires but-for cause.54  As with Gross, the
48. Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
49. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013).
50. See id. at 2525–28.
51. Id. at 2525–28, 2534; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
52. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522.
53. See id. at 2524–25 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt.b (AM. LAW INST. 2010), 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 432(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965), and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
54. Id. at 2525.
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Nassar Court’s description of factual cause is narrower than that con-
cept is defined at common law.
Together Staub, Gross, and Nassar represent a shift in the way that
the U.S. Supreme Court uses tort law.  A reliable majority of Justices
are comfortable using tort law with little additional argument about
why tort law is appropriate.  Tort law is no longer just persuasive au-
thority that serves as one source of potential meaning in discrimina-
tion cases; rather, the Justices can use tort law to find a specific
meaning to particular statutory words or ideas.  The tort law frame-
work is not used for all interpretive questions, but the trend is toward
a more automatic and robust use of tort law.55
III. THE ACTOR
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent discrimination cases purport to
apply common law tort doctrines as enunciated in the Restatement of
Torts, cases, and treatises; they do not claim to specifically mold tort
concepts for the discrimination context.
However, the resulting tort and discrimination doctrine differs in
profound ways from the tort law that preceded it.  In some instances,
the Court itself modifies the underlying tort doctrine without any ex-
plicit indication that it is doing so.  The Court claims to apply tort
common law but, instead, describes the tort law in ways that modify it.
In other instances, other aspects of the discrimination statutes neces-
sarily impact the tort doctrine, but the case law fails to recognize this
impact.  Using the Restatement of Torts as the doctrinal model for tort
law, this Part discusses how the discrimination statute’s use of entity
liability alters tort concepts.
The Restatement (Second) begins with a definition section.  In that
section, a definition for the word “actor” appears.  The Restatement
defines the word “actor” as “the person whose conduct is in question
as subjecting him to liability toward another, or as precluding him
from recovering against another whose tortious conduct is a legal
cause of the actor’s injury.”56
Two words in this definition require emphasis: “the person.”  These
two words convey two concepts that are important to understand how
the Restatement applies to discrimination law.  The definition assumes
that a person is acting.  It also assumes that only one person is acting.
55. This Article does not argue that tort reasoning is required to reach the results in each of
these cases. This Part makes a descriptive claim about how the Court invoked tort law.
56. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 3 (emphasis added).
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This definition poses significant problems for the use of the Restate-
ment in the federal discrimination context.
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, the employer is typi-
cally the entity liable for violating the statutes.57  If a supervisor sexu-
ally harasses a subordinate, the employer is potentially liable for this
conduct, but the harassing supervisor is not.  If a supervisor makes a
decision to terminate an employee because of race, only the employer
is potentially liable for that conduct.
For many traditional torts, the Restatement model first assumes that
an individual actor is liable for a particular tort.  Employers might be
liable for these torts through some kind of derivative liability, but this
liability typically depends first on establishing the actor’s violation of
tort law and then a secondary analysis about whether the employer
should be liable for such an action.  The Restatement (Second) does
not exclude direct entity liability, but the way it conceives and ex-
plains the actor in the intentional tort context largely regards the acts
of individuals not entities.58
Federal employment discrimination law is not so divided.  The em-
ployer, and only the employer, is potentially liable for violating the
statute.  The employer’s liability can arise in many different contexts,
some of which look like direct liability, others that are based on deriv-
ative liability, and some that are a combination of the employer’s acts
(or failures to act) and a person’s actions.
For example, in some instances there might be a single bad actor
who commits sexual harassment that is contrary to company policy
and culture.  In these instances, the employer is not liable for its own
intent or actions but, rather, vicariously liable for the acts of its em-
ployees.59  The U.S. Supreme Court has created a derivative liability
analysis that will sometimes hold the employer liable in these in-
stances.  This derivative liability does not mimic agency principles tra-
ditionally used in the tort context.
57. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–(c) (2012) (indicating that employers, employment agencies,
and certain labor organizations are prohibited from acting in similar ways); id. § 2000e-2(a); 29
U.S.C. §§ 623(a)–(c) (2012) (indicating that employers are prohibited from discriminating
against potential employees); see, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (indi-
cating that Title VII applies to former employees); Creusere v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F. App’x 813,
822 n.12 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that two named defendants were not “employees” under Title
VII); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Title VII does not
provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors or fellow employees.”). See generally
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee”); id. § 12111(2) (defining covered entity to include
“an employer, employment agency, [or] labor organization”).
58. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 3 (focusing on the acts of a single “person”).
59. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 807 (1998).
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However, in some discrimination scenarios, the corporate culture or
corporate policies perpetuate or aid the discrimination.  Tort law that
focuses on what people are doing will miss the crucial role that the
employer plays as an entity.  From the plaintiff’s viewpoint, a Restate-
ment intentional tort model that focuses on what people do will un-
necessarily limit discrimination by failing to recognize the role that
corporate policies and informal norms play in shaping discrimination.
It also will not properly account for how the employer, as an entity,
plays a role in discrimination if it fails to stop repeated acts of discrim-
ination.  From the employer’s perspective, this person-centered model
fails to fully consider whether the employer’s efforts to identify and
correct discrimination should affect liability.
The Restatement’s definition of actor is also problematic in the dis-
crimination context because it assumes that there is only one actor.
Additionally, when it provides examples of an actor’s conduct, the ex-
amples only involve one individual committing an act.  For example,
when the Restatement (Second) gives examples of intent, those exam-
ples are all of individual people committing an act.  In one example, a
person pulls the trigger of a gun in the Mohave Desert.60  Other exam-
ples involve a person throwing a bomb into a building and one person
recklessly driving a car.61
This single actor model does not fully capture how discrimination
occurs.  Consider two examples.  First, consider a law firm’s decision
to invite associates to become partners or members of the firm.  Many
people are allowed to provide input into the partnership decision.
This input may be collected over years as the cumulative result of for-
mal performance reviews and informal impressions about the associ-
ate’s performance.  Some members of the decision-making body have
more influence over the decision than others, and some members have
more interest in seeing that a particular associate does or does not get
promoted.  At the end of the decision-making process, there is a deci-
sion about whether to promote the associate, but there may be no
definitive reason for that decision.  Indeed, the individual people in
the group may have different reasons for reaching the result.
Or consider a second example of cases that are known as cat’s paw
cases.  The name “cat’s paw” is based on a story in which a monkey
wants to get nuts out of a fire.  The monkey convinces a cat to obtain
the nuts and then the monkey steals them, the result being that the
monkey obtains the nuts and the cat ends up with a burnt paw.  Thus,
60. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a.
61. Id. § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1–2.
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the term “cat’s paw” refers to one person being used as the tool of
another.62
In cat’s paw cases, the employer alleges that it cannot be held liable
for discrimination because a person acting without intent actually
made the employment decision.  The plaintiff typically argues that the
decision maker relied on biased information, served as a conduit for
the discrimination of others, or merely rubber stamped a discrimina-
tory decision made by another person.  In other words, while intent is
present in these cases, the ultimate decision maker is not the person
who possesses this intent.  One example of this kind of case is when an
unbiased human resources professional decides to terminate an indi-
vidual based on the biased input of another individual.
The Restatement model of a single actor neither adequately de-
scribes multi-actor or multi-tiered decision making nor recognizes that
each actor may be acting with a different intent.  As we will see later
in the intent and causation discussion,63 this has important implica-
tions for the Restatement’s usefulness in discrimination cases.
The Restatement (Third): Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm (Restatement (Third)) continues to rely on the definitions con-
tained in the first division of the Restatement (Second), which would
include the definition of “actor.”64  While the Restatement (Third)
continues to use the person and actor language, the comments in Sec-
tion 1 make it clear that an actor can be an entity, and some of the
comments generally recognize that an entity can possess intent.65
However, the Restatement (Third) does not directly address multi-
tiered or multi-party decision making.  And, the Restatement (Third)
provides almost no guidance on what it means for an entity to know
something, to possess intent, or to cause something to occur.
The Restatement (Second) largely ignores entities when defining
torts and their elements.  It is easy to imagine that if the Restatement
and tort law had started with a different model of the wrongful actor
that the torts themselves might be different.  These torts might focus
more on harms that entities can create, and they likely would have a
better discussion about how an entity can harm people.  Tort law
might recognize that groups of people organized together in certain
62. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
63. See infra notes 71–115 and accompanying text. R
64. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 1
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (intro).
65. See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. c, illus. 3 (providing an example of a company that releases chemicals
into the air).
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ways, such as corporations, act together in ways that are different than
the types of joint action imagined by the Restatement.
To more directly state the point, if the Restatement originally fo-
cused on entities as actors, we would likely have different torts with
different elements, different ideas of intent, and different notions of
harm.  These new torts, or new ways of thinking about old torts, would
require the Restatement to grapple more deeply with fundamental
questions about the nature of entities, their duties, and their responsi-
bilities, rather than relegating these issues to agency analysis.66
The federal discrimination statutes place responsibility at the entity
level rather than at the individual level.  This is a fundamental differ-
ence between most intentional tort law and discrimination law.  It is
difficult to map an individual-actor tort model onto a statute focused
on entity liability.  Nonetheless, the entity liability model is the one
Congress created for discrimination.  Difficulties emerge when the
Court tries to use tort ideas that largely developed in the context of
the individual actor tort.
A good example of these difficulties is found in Staub.  In that case,
the plaintiff alleged that his supervisors disapproved of his taking
leave for military training.67  He alleged that two supervisors falsely
reported job performance issues to the human resources depart-
ment.68  An unbiased person in the human resources department then
made the decision to fire him.69
If we were to follow a tort model of intent, we would be largely
looking at two possible models.  First, does the employer, as an entity,
possess the required intent (direct liability model)? Second, do the
employer’s employees possess the required intent for which the com-
pany is liable under some model of derivative liability (the derivative
liability model)?
In Staub, neither construct is helpful in answering whether the re-
quired intent exists.  The employer has delegated its authority to mul-
tiple actors, giving one set of actors the ability to recommend
termination and giving the human resources department the ability to
make the final decision.  It is impossible to tease out the employer’s
intent in such a case.  But, the derivative liability model does not fully
work here either.  This is because it is unclear what the individual
would need to intend and to accomplish for derivative liability to at-
66. See also, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579–81 (1990) (discussing corporate personhood).
67. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 413–14 (2011).
68. Id. at 414–15.
69. Id.
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tach.  Must the biased supervisors possess both intent and the ability
to fire an employee before the employer faces possible derivative lia-
bility?  A strict application of tort law’s intent standard does not pro-
vide a clear answer.
This is why, even though the Court in Staub used a tort definition of
intent, it must connect that idea to different notions of the actor,
harm, and causation to make sense in the discrimination context.
Staub may involve tort words, but these tort words necessarily change
to accommodate entity-based liability rather than the direct liability or
derivative liability models imagined by traditional tort law.70
IV. INTENT AND HARM
Individual disparate treatment claims are often described as requir-
ing intent, and it may seem easy to apply the Restatement’s intentional
tort paradigm to these claims.  This Part outlines some of the key chal-
lenges posed by mapping the Restatement’s intent analysis onto dis-
crimination claims.
Problems begin with the scope of the Restatement’s intentional
torts.  The Restatement (Second) defines the intentional torts as inten-
tional harm to persons, land, or chattels.  The Restatement (Second)
further defines the scope of harms to persons to include the following:
(1) “the interest in freedom from harmful bodily contacts”; (2) “the
interest in freedom from offensive bodily contacts”; (3) “the interest
in freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact”; (4)
“the interest in freedom from confinement”; and (5) “the interest in
freedom from emotional distress.”71
It is difficult to place the harms of discrimination law within this
frame.  This problem continues into the Restatement (Third), which
contains different sections organized by type of harm.72  When the
courts apply traditional common law notions of intent to discrimina-
tion law, they are necessarily applying intent standards designed to
protect different interests.
Employment discrimination law protects various interests.  The
harms of discrimination are often economic in nature but also involve
harms to personal dignity, equality norms, and group harms.  As
Martha Chamallas, Professor at the Ohio State University’s Moritz
College of Law, has noted: “such claims often articulate a type of in-
70. See id. at 419–20 (presenting a confusing analysis that mentions ideas of agency, factual
cause, and proximate cause without explaining how they fit together).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1–8 (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (appendix).
72. See, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (liability for physical harm).
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jury—disproportionately experienced by members of subordinated
groups—that cannot be pinned down as psychological, economic, or
physical in nature, or as either individual or group based.”73  The
“multidimensional quality of the harm” in employment discrimination
cases “defies categorization under traditional headings” and makes it
problematic to map traditional tort causes of action onto
discrimination.74
The intentional tort harms do not fully capture all of the harms of
discrimination.  Perhaps, more importantly, tort law typically protects
different interests through different torts.  Thus, torts involving the
unlawful taking of chattels look very different than torts involving the
interest in freedom from harmful bodily contacts, such as battery.  Be-
cause discrimination often involves multiparadigmatic harms, it is dif-
ficult to understand how to apply tort law to discrimination claims.  In
other words, what is the correct model: battery, trespass to chattels,
other intentional torts, or some combination of multiple intentional
torts?  More fundamentally, it is unclear whether discrimination law
belongs in the intentional tort category at all.
Another broad conceptual problem involves how the Restatement
defines intent and connects it to harm.  The Restatement (Second) de-
fines “intent” to denote “that the actor desires to cause [the] conse-
quences of [her] act, or that [she] believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.”75  But, strangely, even fifty
years after Title VII’s enactment, courts have not clearly defined the
concept of harm in employment discrimination cases.  Is harm the
manifested intent used to treat an employee differently because of a
protected trait?  Or, does harm not occur until that intent manifests
itself in certain kinds of employment actions, such as termination or
failure to promote?
This question is especially important in the discrimination context
in which some courts require an employee to prove that an adverse
action occurred before assigning liability.76  In other words, the plain-
tiff is required to establish that the actions taken against her rose
above a court-defined seriousness threshold before liability attaches.
If an employer takes an action because of a protected trait but the
73. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2147 (2007).
74. Id. at 2146–47.
75. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
76. See, e.g., Devin v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 491 F.3d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated
by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Frank, 828 F.
Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a rating of “unacceptable” at a mid-year review
was not an adverse employment action).
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action does not meet the definition of an adverse action, the employer
will not face liability.  For example, courts often hold that employees
have not been discriminated or retaliated against if the employee re-
ceives a negative evaluation or write-up as long as that evaluation
does not result in some other kind of harm.77
If a supervisor writes such an evaluation for a discriminatory rea-
son, the Restatement of Torts is not helpful in answering whether the
supervisor had the proper intent.  In the discrimination context, we do
not know what consequences the supervisor would need to intend.
Would he need to intend to write the evaluation because of a pro-
tected trait or would he need to intend a more serious consequence,
such as termination, to result from writing the evaluation?  These
questions become even more difficult in the modern employment con-
text in which multiple people and departments often participate in
employment outcomes.
The intent standard is useful in the Restatement, in part, because the
necessary consequences are better articulated for the intentional torts
covered by the Restatement.  Because the consequences for discrimi-
nation are not defined in the Restatement, the Restatement becomes
less helpful in responding to discrimination problems.  In the discrimi-
nation context, the Restatement leaves one important part of the intent
question unanswered: What consequences must the actor intend?
Looking at the Restatement’s intent examples illustrates some of the
problems of applying its idea of intent to discrimination problems.
Here is one of the examples provided for intent in the Restatement
(Second): “A throws a bomb into B’s office for the purpose of killing
B.  A knows that C, B’s stenographer, is in the office.  A has no desire
to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so.  C
is injured by the explosion.”78
This example illustrates an intent that has several key traits.  First,
the intent refers to that of an individual.  Second, the individual in
question has the ability to carry out the entire act of throwing the
bomb.  Third, the intent described in the example contemplates imme-
diate, known consequences.  Fourth, there are no actions by others
that can mediate or intervene in the intent.  Finally, all of the illustra-
tions in § 8A of the Restatement (Second) are of individuals doing a
single act.
The traits underlying these examples fail to fully capture the factual
realities of discrimination in the modern workplace, which makes it
77. See, e.g., Johnson, 828 F. Supp. at 1153.
78. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1.
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difficult to apply these examples to the discrimination context.  Imag-
ine the following hypothetical.  A law firm makes compensation deci-
sions using a multifactor scale, including billable hours, future
potential, and fit with the firm, as primary criteria.  Most of the mem-
bers of the compensation committee are men.  A review of compensa-
tion decisions made over the past three years shows that female
associates are paid less than male associates and that the compensa-
tion levels are not explained by billable hours.  There is evidence that
one of the members of the compensation committee always votes
against female associates for partner, never works with female associ-
ates, and has made demeaning comments about female employees’
commitment to the firm.
In this example, the Restatement’s intent model is not helpful in de-
termining whether the resulting compensation decisions were inten-
tional in a traditional tort sense.  Multiple people are contributing to
the decision and may have made decisions based on different criteria.
It is not clear what role, if any, the biased partner played in the ulti-
mate compensation decisions and what effect his comments had on
others.  Given the discrimination statutes’ focus on entity liability, it is
unclear whether the firm might be held derivatively liable for intent-
based actions of individual actors or whether its liability exists because
of its own failure to monitor its compensation practices.  None of the
Restatement’s examples help us resolve this employment discrimina-
tion problem.
V. CAUSATION
Similar problems occur when applying the common law causation
doctrine to discrimination law.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeat-
edly claimed to apply traditional tort causation principles to discrimi-
nation law while at the same time describing a causation doctrine that
is very different from its Restatement analog.  Additionally, just like
with intent, the causation question is also affected by other elements
of the discrimination claim.  It is important to know who must cause
what.
At common law, causation often embraces two different kinds of
issues: (1) cause in fact and (2) legal or proximate cause.79  “Conduct
is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred
absent the conduct.”80  In some tort cases, such as negligence cases,
79. The distinction between these two concepts is often blurred.  Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause:
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 944–45 (2001).
80. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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factual cause is a necessary but not sufficient basis for imposing liabil-
ity on a defendant for harm.  In these cases, courts require legal cause,
also called proximate cause.  The U.S. Supreme Court has applied
both factual cause and proximate cause ideas to discrimination claims.
A. Factual Cause
In both Gross and Nassar, the Court purported to apply a tort fac-
tual cause standard to discrimination cases.81  The factual cause ele-
ment in discrimination law differs in three important ways from its
common law analog defined in the Restatement of Torts.
First, the employment discrimination substantive standard is much
narrower than that provided by the Restatement and does not provide
any flexibility for shifting some or all of the causation burden to the
defendant.  Second, the U.S. Supreme Court uses the but-for cause
standard from the Restatement section on negligence even though the
Court continues to refer to individual disparate treatment cases as in-
tentional torts.  Finally, the causation element in negligence cases
links together other elements of the cause of action.  In the discrimi-
nation context, the Court has not clearly defined how the causation
element links to other elements.  This question becomes increasingly
important in the discrimination context in which the employer is the
entity responsible for the legal violation and the harm element has not
yet been adequately defined.
In Gross and Nassar, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that tort law
requires the plaintiff to prove factual cause, and the required factual
cause standard is but-for cause.82  The factual cause standard provided
by the Restatement (Second) is much more flexible than the rigid stan-
dard applied by the Court in the discrimination context.
The Restatement contemplates that the but-for cause standard is not
appropriate in cases in which an outcome is overdetermined.83  The
classic example of overdetermined outcomes is the two fires hypothet-
ical.  The Restatement (Second) provides the following example of
when a strict application of but-for cause would not be appropriate.
Two fires are negligently set by separate acts of the A and B Rail-
way Companies in forest country during a dry season. The two fires
coalesce before setting fire to C’s timber land and house. The nor-
mal spread of either fire would have been sufficient to burn the
house and timber. C barely escapes from his house, suffering burns
81. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).
82. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533; Gross, 557 U.S. at 177–78.
83. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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while so doing. It may be found that the negligence of either the A
or the B Company or of both is a substantial factor in bringing
about C’s harm.84
The U.S. Supreme Court only imported but-for cause into ADEA and
Title VII retaliation claims without explaining why it did not apply the
full definition of factual cause found in the Restatement (Second), in-
cluding the possibility of a different causal standard for overdeter-
mined causation cases.
The truncated standard is problematic because some discrimination
cases are similar to the two fires hypothetical but have one key differ-
ence: in discrimination or retaliation cases stemming from multiple
sources, all of the actors and their acts are typically under the control
of the employer.  The two fires hypothetical anticipates that the defen-
dant negligently set one of the fires and a separate actor set the sec-
ond fire.
An example is helpful in illustrating how some discrimination cases
fit within this overdetermined factual cause construct.  Suppose that
an employee complains about discriminatory conduct by a supervisor.
The accused supervisor then begins to micromanage the employee’s
work and finds mistakes with it.  The supervisor terminates the em-
ployee for making mistakes.  Even though the supervisor harbors ani-
mus toward the employee for complaining, the supervisor would not
have been able to terminate the employee without showing that she
made the mistakes.
Under the at-will employment doctrine, the employer can fire the
employee for making mistakes.  In one sense, the employee’s termina-
tion is caused by her mistakes.  But, the supervisor would not have
learned about the mistakes unless the employee complained about
discrimination.  In this scenario, it is possible that there is only one of
two possible causes for the employee’s termination: mistakes or retali-
ation.  But, it is also possible that there are two causes for the em-
ployee’s termination: both the retaliatory motive and the mistakes
combined to lead to the termination.  Further, in the retaliation con-
text, it may be even more difficult to ferret out whether the retaliatory
motive caused the termination if the supervisor terminated other non-
complaining employees for making similar mistakes but also contin-
ued to employ some workers who made those same mistakes.
The but-for cause standard is not the correct substantive standard
for determining employer liability in this situation.  It fails to take into
84. Id. § 432 cmt. d, illus. 3.
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account that multiple reasons may lead to an employment outcome.85
It also fails to take into account that supervisors may not fully under-
stand why they are acting or that a supervisor may both find mistakes
with an employee’s work and also be acting for retaliatory reasons.
Traditional tort law would allow a court to use a substantial factor
cause standard in situations when the but-for cause standard is prob-
lematic.  In this respect, the tort standard for developing factual cause
is much more capacious than the standard the U.S. Supreme Court
applied in Gross and Nassar.
The Court’s interpretation of the ADEA and the Title VII retalia-
tion provision also ignores the possibility for shifting the burden of
proving all or some causation to the defendant.  The Restatement (Sec-
ond) allows the causation burden of proof to shift to the defendant in
certain instances.86  However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this
possibility in both Gross and Nassar.  This failure to even discuss tort
law’s burden-shifting possibilities in detail is strange because the
Court explicitly recognized this possibility in the Title VII discrimina-
tion context.87
Current factual cause analysis is also unsatisfactory because the Su-
preme Court has not explained how its causation jurisprudence inter-
sects with intentional discrimination.  Although there is a strong
argument that plaintiffs should not be required to prove intent in dis-
crimination cases, courts often require intent in individual disparate
treatment cases.88  Courts have never carefully articulated how the
causal standards interact with the intent requirement.  This issue is
further confused because courts have not clarified what intent means
in discrimination cases and whether the intent required in discrimina-
tion cases is synonymous with the common law definition of the
term.89  A further textual problem arises in the discrimination context
because the courts have interpreted the “because of” language in the
85. See Weber v. City of New York, for an example of a court grappling with how to apply the
but-for cause standard in the retaliation context. See 973 F. Supp. 2d 227, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
86. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B.
87. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
88. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
89. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 914–15 (2005); see D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing
Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 736–37
(1987) (suggesting that Title VII should examine motive not intent).  Further, the meaning of
intent is less clear after Ricci v. DeStafano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).  Stephen M. Rich, Against
Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that the case moved away from an ani-
mus-based notion).
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statutes to relate to both intent and causation.90  It also remains un-
clear how the causation element intersects with the other elements of
the discrimination claim.  Questions remain as to which actor must
cause the consequence and what consequence must result.
Likewise, there are questions about how much the employer’s ef-
forts to prevent or correct discrimination should affect the employer’s
liability.  The courts created a convoluted agency-like analysis for de-
termining when an employer is liable for harassment.91  This analysis
allows an employer to escape liability for harassment by a supervisor
if the harassment does not result in a tangible employment action and
the employer is able to establish an affirmative defense to liability.92
This court-created, discrimination-specific agency doctrine is different
from negligence-based ideas of culpability when an actor is not able to
escape liability by engaging in negligent activity and then attempting
to mitigate the harm caused by the negligent conduct.93  The courts
have not explored how this discrimination-specific agency analysis
changes common law ideas of causation.
The U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the scope of factual cause when
it imported this concept into discrimination law.  It also failed to ex-
plain how factual cause intersects with intent, the remaining elements
of a discrimination claim, and the court-created agency analysis. Al-
though the Court’s discrimination jurisprudence changed common law
factual cause in important ways, the cases did not explicitly recognize
these changes.
90. Rich, supra note 89, at 45–47; see Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Ha- R
rassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1357, 1374–76 (2009) (discussing causation in disparate treatment cases).  There are strong argu-
ments that discrimination should not be concerned with the narrow concepts of motivation, in-
tent, or causation. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 94–97 (1991).
Depending on the underlying claim, factual cause questions may play varying roles in each case.
In pattern or practice cases, the causal requirement plays diminished significance because the
plaintiff is required to demonstrate that discrimination was the standard operating procedure of
the company. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
91. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
92. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
93. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 437 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If the actor’s
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that after the
risk has been created by his negligence the actor has exercised reasonable care to prevent it from
taking effect in harm does not prevent him from being liable for the harm.”).
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B. Proximate Cause
In Staub, the U.S. Supreme Court purported to apply proximate
cause to a discrimination claim;94 however, the proximate cause con-
cept applied to discrimination law cannot be coterminous with the
concept of proximate cause as that term is understood at common law.
When applying proximate cause in the discrimination context, courts
must consider congressional judgments about liability.  Also, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not recognized that if an individual disparate
treatment claim is an intentional tort, it would be inappropriate to
apply a negligence-based proximate cause doctrine to it.
Proximate cause is a difficult doctrine to apply because it has evolv-
ing, contested underpinnings and goals.95  Thus, it is difficult to state
that there is one proximate cause doctrine.  The concept of proximate
cause also changes dramatically depending on the underlying tort to
which it is appended.
Nonetheless, proximate cause is ultimately a judgment call about
where liability should end, and its definition depends on the underly-
ing claim to which it is attached.  Importantly, Congress has already
spoken about the limits of discrimination law and has provided a stat-
ute that narrowly circumscribes the available cause of action.  When
the U.S. Supreme Court imports proximate cause ideas into discrimi-
nation law, the resulting discrimination and proximate cause doctrine
must be different than its common law counterpart because, in the
discrimination context, courts must take into account Congress’s ex-
pressions about where liability should end.  Given the significant lim-
its found in the discrimination statutes, it is questionable whether
proximate cause is even needed.
The employment discrimination statutes and related court-created
agency doctrine already address many of the questions that proximate
cause handles in a common law analysis.  The federal statutes address
questions regarding the foreseeability of the plaintiff and reasonably
anticipated consequences by limiting the types of plaintiffs who have
viable claims and by requiring those plaintiffs to have certain statuto-
94. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 n.2 (2011).
95. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) (“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagree-
ment, or upon which opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”).  The Restatement has recently
started to use the words “scope of liability” to refer to proximate cause and has also focused the
inquiry on the scope of risk.  1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  Using Restatement sections applicable to physi-
cal harm cases may not be appropriate in statutes when the harms are emotional or economic in
nature.
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rily defined relationships with the defendant.96  For the most part, the
aggrieved party must be an employee, or former employee, and the
liable entity is typically an employer, an employment agency, or a la-
bor organization.97
Congress also severely limited the time frame that an aggrieved
party has to start a claim.  A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimina-
tion with a federal or state agency within a specified time and must
then file the lawsuit within a specified time period.98  If a plaintiff does
not file the charge within the required period, the claim is usually
barred.99
In some instances, federal employment statutes, or court interpreta-
tions of those statutes, also prescribe the types of conduct that result
in liability.  For example, courts only allow recovery in a harassment
case if the harm is severe or pervasive, and, in discrimination cases,
courts require the plaintiff to establish that the harm is serious enough
to rise to the level of an adverse employment action.100  Further, the
statutes provide instances when it is lawful to take a protected trait
into account when making an employment decision.101  Thus, by stat-
ute, employment discrimination law deals with a narrow universe of
victims and actors and, in some cases, a limited set of actionable con-
duct.  The potential scope of federal employment discrimination law is
also limited by court-created doctrine that restricts the circumstances
under which an employer will be held liable for discriminatory
conduct.
Unlike traditional common law torts, the major federal employment
discrimination regimes contain damages provisions that explicitly limit
96. See supra note 57 (discussing federal statutes). R
97. See id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012).  The requirements under the ADEA vary slightly but
still require the filing of a charge. See Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010
WL 5232523, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (noting that Title VII requires plaintiffs to receive
a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission while the ADEA
does not contain this requirement).  The time frame varies depending on the type of harm al-
leged.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110
(2002).  The period begins when the plaintiff has notice of the discriminatory action. See Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (providing
limits for compensation decisions); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 208 (2010) (describing
how limits work in disparate impact cases); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (discussing the procedures
for a harassment claim).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (setting forth the required times for filing a charge of
discrimination).
100. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
101. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e), (h).
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and calibrate damages to each particular regime.102  Further, the stat-
utes provide a fairly limited set of damages.  For example, under the
ADEA, the only monetary relief that a plaintiff may be awarded is
front pay, back pay, and a liquidated damages award.103  The plaintiff
may not obtain compensatory or punitive damages.104  Both Title VII
and the ADA cap the total combined compensatory and punitive
damages a plaintiff may recover.105  The size of the cap depends on
the number of employees.106  The highest cap, which applies to em-
ployers with more than 500 employees, is $300,000 and has not been
adjusted since 1991.107  These limits are important because they mini-
mize concerns that employers will face liability that is disproportion-
ate to the conduct at issue.
The Restatement (Third) notes that an actor is liable when she in-
tentionally causes harm even if the harm was unlikely to occur.  Addi-
tionally, intentional actors are liable for a broader range of harms
than negligent actors.108  In deciding the scope of liability, the Restate-
ment (Third) notes that the following factors play important roles in
the analysis: “the moral culpability of the actor, . . . the seriousness of
harm intended and threatened by those acts, and the degree to which
the actor’s conduct deviated from appropriate care.”109  When apply-
ing each of these factors to the statutory context, Congress’s views on
culpability, harm, and the appropriate duty of care necessarily impact
the resulting limits.
One problem with the Court’s use of tort-derived proximate cause
in the discrimination context is the Court’s failure to recognize that
discrimination-derived proximate cause is not coterminous with how
102. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-5(g) (providing that courts may “order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate”);
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–73 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (amending Title VII to provide for compensatory and punitive
damages); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295–96 (2002) (noting the similar-
ity between ADA and Title VII remedies).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (2012).
104. See id. § 216(b). But see Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Why Punitive Dam-
ages Should Be Awarded for Retaliatory Discharge Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 HOF-
STRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 715, 748 (2004) (discussing whether punitive damages are available for
retaliation claims).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
106. Id.
107. See id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
108. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
109. Id.  The Restatement view is even more nuanced, noting that when intent is established by
showing that the defendant was substantially certain, proximate cause should not be as narrow as
it is with other intent cases. Id. § 33 cmt. d.
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that concept is understood at common law.  A second problem is that
the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized that proximate cause
rarely plays a role in intentional tort cases.
Common law courts apply proximate cause differently depending
on the nature of the underlying tort. Staub purported to apply the
negligence proximate cause doctrine, but it also described discrimina-
tion as requiring intentional conduct.110  Proximate cause rarely plays
a decisive role in intentional tort cases.111  There are many reasons for
this.  In intentional tort cases, “the defendant’s wrongful conduct is
[usually] closely linked—temporally and conceptually—to the plain-
tiff’s harm.”112  Few intentional tort cases involve multiple causes.113
Conduct intended to cause harm is considered more “blameworthy,”
and courts have had fewer qualms about the scope of liability.114
Thus, the necessity and strength of the proximate cause doctrine se-
verely diminishes in the intentional tort context.  When proximate
cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, the proximate cause analysis
may cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances than it
would when applied to negligence.115 The Court does not explicitly
discuss why it is appropriate to apply a negligence-based proximate
cause analysis to a cause of action it describes as requiring intent.
VI. THE NEW FRANKEN-TORT
When the U.S. Supreme Court relies on the common law of torts to
interpret discrimination statutes, it appears to rely on a rich tradition
of settled doctrine.  It seems as if the Justices are not making any
choices about the trajectory of discrimination law.  Rather, tort law
demands a particular result.  This analytical trope is nothing new.
110. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011).
111. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 cmt. e (noting the paucity of legal opinions discussing proximate cause in intentional tort
cases).
112. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV.
811, 832 (2009).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 832–33.
115. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (“An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a broader
range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”);
see id. § 33 cmt. a (noting that the scope of risk standard is inadequate with respect to intentional
torts); see also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 421 (2004) (noting that proximate cause applies to
strict liability cases). But see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens Patriae Litigation
to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolution of
Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 68 (2011) (asserting that courts do not typically
apply proximate cause to strict liability cases).
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Nonetheless, when the Court employs the trope, it is necessary to
point out the choices the Court made.
Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has imported tort law in the
context of smaller skirmishes about particular aspects of the discrimi-
nation doctrine.  What should the factual cause standard be?  Should
an employer face liability in cat’s paw cases?  When should this liabil-
ity attach?
The Court has ignored the more important issues.  The Court has
failed to recognize how its articulation of tort law is different from the
common law doctrine.  It ignored how the statutory context necessa-
rily changes traditional tort concepts.  It has not provided any frame-
work for how all of these new tort elements fit together.  It has not
aligned the new tort doctrines with the decades of court-created dis-
crimination doctrine that preceded tortification.  It has failed to ex-
plain whether its new tort-based frame actually answers the question
of whether a person has been treated differently because of a pro-
tected trait.
In Gross, Staub, and Nassar, the Court focused on individual tort
concepts, such as intent, factual cause, and proximate cause.116  It im-
ported these concepts into discrimination jurisprudence.  None of
these cases discussed how these concepts should work together to
form a proof structure for establishing a discrimination claim.  This
Part pieces together the rough outlines of the new, court-created
Franken-tort.  It then discusses some of this new tort’s implications.
A. The Discrimination Tort
Reading Gross, Staub, and Nassar together, it is possible to cobble
together the pieces of the emerging tort-like discrimination standard
for individual discrimination claims.  Because the Title VII discrimina-
tion analysis is different from the analysis under the ADEA,117 I use
an age discrimination claim to model the new tort and discrimination
elements.  To establish this claim, the Court appears to require some
combination of the following elements: (1) some undefined kind of
intent involving age; (2) an actor who intended some consequence
(perhaps an adverse action); and (3) a causation element involving
both but-for factual cause and an amorphously defined proximate
cause.  The new Franken-tort has component pieces that vaguely re-
semble the tort elements from which they are drawn.  But, each of
116. See supra notes 33–55 and accompanying text. R
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring a motivating factor analysis for Title
VII claims).
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these elements is unmoored from the traditional tort categories of in-
tentional torts, negligence, or strict liability.  The Court’s Franken-tort
pieces together approximations of elements from both intentional
torts and negligence but without the full support of the surrounding
doctrines.
As discussed throughout this Article, each of these tort elements
significantly changes when imported into the discrimination context.
This is because the Court either subtly redefined the concepts or
failed to recognize how the discrimination claim itself forces changes
in the underlying doctrine.118  The Court marries but-for cause and
proximate cause standards from negligence law into a claim that the
Court deems to require some type of intent.  As discussed throughout
this Article, underneath this fairly simple set of elements are complex
questions about intent, causation, and employer liability for actions
that occur within the workplace.
The Court provided little guidance as to how these pieces fit to-
gether with one another or how they connect to the rest of the statu-
tory language.  Further, the Court made no attempt to connect these
tort principles with its own court-created proof structures for discrimi-
nation cases.  For example, there was no discussion about how these
elements integrate with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test,
which has been one of the primary ways of evaluating individual dis-
parate treatment claims for more than forty years.119  Further, the
Court did not explain how the new tort-based discrimination concepts
intersect with the court-created harassment doctrine.120
Each of these tort elements, as well as the final proof structure that
emerges from them, is also unmoored from the history, precedent, and
policies that undergird discrimination law.  Once the individual pieces
are put together, it is unclear whether the emerging structure will ac-
tually determine whether an employer treated an employee differ-
ently because of a protected trait.
Highlighting just two of the issues that are arising in the wake of
tortification shows how these concerns manifest themselves in prac-
tice.  In McDonnell Douglas, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced a
three-part burden-shifting proof structure to evaluate individual dis-
parate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence.121  Courts
118. The following analysis focuses on how the Court appears to characterize the elements of
a disparate treatment claim.  The implications of tortification for disparate impact claims is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
119. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
120. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
121. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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have applied this test in the ADEA context;122 however, it is unclear
how this long-used test is compatible with the but-for cause test.
Although uncommon, under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff can
prevail if the defendant fails to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its actions after the plaintiff establishes the prima facie
case.  The plaintiff can also force the defendant to articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions by establishing a prima
facie case.  However, if the ADEA requires the plaintiff to establish
but-for cause, it is unclear whether the plaintiff should prevail if she
establishes the prima facie case and the defendant fails to meet its
burden under the second prong of the test.  Under this scenario, the
plaintiff has not established that age was the but-for cause of the em-
ployment action.
If the plaintiff is required to establish causation, it also is unclear
why the defendant should be forced to articulate a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its action.  This is not compatible with the way
a tort inquiry into causation would proceed in a case in which the
plaintiff is required to prove causation.  In these cases, the defendant
has no obligation to articulate its reason for acting.
The question of how but-for cause intersects with McDonnell Doug-
las is percolating in the lower courts.123  Much judicial and litigant
time and energy will be devoted to trying to reconcile this question.
But, it is not at all clear how reconciling but-for cause and McDonnell
Douglas is necessary or even helpful to understanding whether an em-
ployment outcome was impermissibly tainted by a protected trait.
Or, take a cat’s paw case involving actions by coworkers.124  Under
the new employment discrimination tort standard, some notion of in-
tent is tied to but-for cause and proximate cause.  But, this rough out-
line of the tort concepts leaves many questions unanswered.  If a
coworker submits false information to a supervisor because of bias
and the supervisor then terminates the employee based on the false
information provided by the coworker, should the employer be liable
for discrimination?  The answer to this question heavily depends on
the required connection between causation, intent, the actor, and no-
tions of employer liability.  This is especially true in the coworker cat’s
paw scenario in which the coworker may have the ability to heavily
influence the employment outcome but does not possess the formal
power to take an adverse action.  The current elements of the discrim-
122. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141–43 (2000).
123. See, e.g., Kalra v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A., 360 F. App’x 214, 216 (2d Cir. 2010).
124. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 09-2692-STA-cgc, 2012 WL 1107834, at *19
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2012).
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ination tort are not connected together in a way that is helpful to an-
swering the question of cat’s paw liability for coworker conduct.
It is also easy to imagine an almost unending stream of questions
that will arise from tortification.  Does the eggshell skull rule apply to
discrimination?  If tort concepts of harm are used, should touching
that would constitute a battery automatically establish harassment?
How do tort concepts intersect with accommodation obligations that
do not have common law tort analogs?  How do the torts of inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress intersect with dis-
crimination law?  Should the courts abandon the current court-created
agency analysis in favor of an agency analysis that more closely ad-
heres to tort standards?  Importantly, it is not clear that answering any
of these questions in the context of tort law helps us better understand
when an employer should be liable for treating workers differently
because of a protected trait.
Tort law was not necessary to resolve the underlying questions in
Gross, Staub, and Nassar, but the choice of tort law inserts unneeded
complexity and confusion into a discrimination jurisprudence that is
already confusing and complex.
B. The Restatement of Torts
The tortification of discrimination law poses many questions to tort
law as a whole.  This Section focuses on the challenges tortification
poses for the Restatement of Torts.  The Restatement of Torts is a pro-
ject with many facets.  It reflects the doctrinal history of tort law.  At
the same time, it is a reform project.  It recognizes emerging areas of
tort law and clarifies legal concepts.  In another sense, the Restatement
defines what activity is within the realm of tort law and what conduct
does not fit within that category.
For the most part, the Restatement of Torts is a project that exten-
sively focuses on the common law of torts.  To date, it has not pur-
ported to provide a history of statutory torts, and it has not added
major sections covering statutory torts that differ in fundamental re-
spects from tort common law.  When courts transform the Restatement
of Torts into the “Restatement of Torts and Civil Rights,” this raises
questions about the scope of the Restatement project.
While the U.S. Supreme Court is starting to define federal discrimi-
nation law as a statutory tort, the American Law Institute (ALI)
should consider whether it deserves that label.  There are many rea-
sons that federal discrimination law does not fit comfortably within
the tort category.  When creating statutes, legislatures are not bound
by historical categories of law, such as those found in the first year law
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school curriculum.  Legislatures are free to create statutes that draw
from many different substantive areas and are also free to create new
causes of action that have little connection with existing common law.
Federal discrimination law addressed a large societal problem that
the common law did not address.  In doing so, the legislature did not
choose an existing tort and modify it for the discrimination context.
Instead, Congress created a new statutory regime that drew from
many different areas of law, including state law discrimination stat-
utes, labor law, and contract law.125  Congress did not explicitly rely
on any particular traditional tort in the federal discrimination statutes.
These statutes are not based on any particular intentional tort, negli-
gence law, or strict liability.  Congress did not organize federal dis-
crimination law with traditional tort elements and did not heavily rely
on traditional tort language.126
The federal discrimination statutes have many provisions with little
or no relationship to tort law.  The statutes recognize disparate impact
claims that do not have a tort analog.127  The statutes also impose ac-
commodation duties that include affirmative obligations to alter envi-
ronment and policies.128  For example, an employer is required to
accommodate certain religious beliefs and practices.129  Under the
ADA, employers are also required to accommodate employees with
disabilities.130  Until 1991, Title VII did not contain tort-like remedies,
and, even now, the remedies regime does not entirely mimic tort
remedies.131
The U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on the Restatement of Torts
poses a challenge to the ALI.  Should it comment at all about the
Court’s use of the Restatement in this way?  Should it enter the discus-
sion about whether discrimination is a tort? If a cause of action did
not organically develop from traditional torts, what criteria does it
have to meet to fit within the umbrella of tort law?  Does the ALI
have the necessary expertise in discrimination law to determine
whether discrimination is tort?
125. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975); see also Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (using contract language to describe Title VII).
126. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
127. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
128. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79–81, 83 n.14 (1977) (dis-
cussing the employer’s obligation under Title VII, in certain circumstances, to make some effort
to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs).
129. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (defining discrimination under the ADA as a failure to provide
reasonable accommodations).
131. See, e.g., id. § 1981a(b)(3).
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If the ALI does deem discrimination a tort, additional issues
emerge.  To include discrimination law in the Restatement would re-
quire the ALI to undertake a mapping exercise of historical propor-
tions.  It would need to shoehorn existing discrimination claims into
the current Restatement organization or create completely new sec-
tions to describe these claims.
The structure of employment discrimination law does not mimic the
organization of tort law.  Discrimination law does not contain a sec-
tion called “intentional torts” or a section called “negligence.”
Through statutory interpretation, the courts have created different in-
terpretive frames for viewing discrimination claims.
Even a cursory description of discrimination law’s organizational
structure shows how different it is than the current organization of the
Restatement.  The U.S. Supreme Court has described different
frameworks for analyzing discrimination cases, which the courts divide
into two broad categories: (1) disparate treatment and (2) disparate
impact.132  Disparate treatment cases are further subdivided into indi-
vidual disparate treatment, harassment, and pattern-or-practice
cases.133  Integrating these different claims and their frameworks into
a tort analysis would be a difficult, if not impossible, task.
It is also unclear how the Restatement should contend with other
aspects of the statutory regime.  When the EEOC issues regulations or
guidance interpreting discrimination law, should this affect the tort
analysis?  If Congress amends the discrimination statutes, how does
this affect the tort analysis?
Even the use of the Restatement of Torts as a dictionary for tort
terms raises interesting questions.  The move to tortify discrimination
law represents a restatement of discrimination law.  At the same time,
it also represents a restatement of tort law.  The  Court’s interpreta-
tion of tort law in the discrimination context has the potential to affect
tort cases.  This is especially true because the relevant U.S. Supreme
Court cases do not explicitly discuss the ways in which the Court al-
tered tort law in the discrimination context.
Just as the tortification of discrimination law raises many questions
for discrimination jurisprudence, it also raises questions for tort law.
132. See Zatz, supra note 90, at 1368 (“Few propositions are less controversial or more em- R
bedded in the structure of Title VII analysis than that the statute recognizes only ‘disparate
treatment’ and ‘disparate impact theories of employment discrimination.’” (quoting Hazen Pa-
per Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993))).
133. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348–49 (1977) (discussing Con-
gress’s proscription of discriminatory policies or practices); Zatz, supra note 90, at 1414 (discuss-
ing the subdivision into individual disparate treatment and harassment cases).
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Will common law courts start to adopt narrow versions of factual
cause in tort cases?  Will common law courts create more causes of
action that combine elements of intentional torts and negligence?
Will courts start to apply notions of proximate cause more robustly in
the intentional tort context?  Will courts start to develop a corporate
intent doctrine?
Given the enormous questions about whether discrimination is a
tort134 and how it relates to common law torts, the better course is for
the ALI to disclaim discrimination as a concern for the Restatement
project.135  The Restatement has not, as a historical matter, undertaken
to describe federal discrimination law or to imagine its future.  To do
so would require a wholesale reimagining of the Restatement of
Torts.136
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has firmly ensconced discrimination law
within a tort frame and invoked the Restatement as its new dictionary
for discrimination terms.  This shift raises important questions for
both discrimination and tort law.  One likely result of this tortification
is that courts will become increasingly concerned with the minutia of
how tort law intersects with discrimination concepts, especially re-
garding how tort law affects existing frameworks for establishing dis-
crimination.  Although this exercise is likely to take up much court
time, the more important question is whether this effort will help soci-
ety understand how discrimination happens in the workplace, how to
best prevent it, and how to remedy it when it does occur.
134. The answer to this question largely depends on how one chooses to define tort law.  See
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160–67 (1973); Mark
Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1157, 1159 (1992); and John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88, TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 (2010), for different views on how to conceptualize tort law.
135. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that tort law does not strictly apply in the insurance con-
text).  I am not advocating that scholars, judges, and practitioners remove themselves from this
issue.  The tortification of discrimination law raises important issues for both tort and discrimina-
tion law that demand further intense consideration.
136. But see 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (describing how infliction of emotional distress might
intersect with a hypothetical based on a pregnant worker and an employment decision).
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